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Abstract
Even though overtime is a widely observed phenomenon, this paper argues against the
view of overtime as a structural cost minimizing labor demand solution. A large part of the
observed overtime can be explained by the volatility of demand and absenteeism.
The paper’s contribution is to investigate how stochastic absenteeism and stochastic
demand tend to increase average hours per worker. Two distinct mechanisms are identified,
independent of the type of uncertainty. The relative sizes of these mechanisms differ between
the type of uncertainty, but also between cost minimization and profit maximization models.
The profit maximization model has the advantage that it predicts a spike at normal hours.
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Overtime is a widely observed phenomenon. Average overtime hours are typically between 2.5%
and 10% of normal hours. This often raises the question whether overtime hours could be trans-
formed into regular jobs. In the US the focus of the debate is in terms of the statutory overtime
premium, see Trejo (1993, 2003), whereas in Europe the debate centers around the European
Working Time directive, see Bell and Hart (2003). Typically the economic analysis is then cast
in a labor demand model, where firms demand structural overtime of their workers. Looking
at the individual workers, however, the majority of workers does not work overtime. More-
over, management typically complains that it is the uncertainty in demand and in absenteeism
that induce them to use overtime.1 In such an environment, policy measures aimed a reducing
structural – i.e. non-stochastic cost minimizing – overtime seem to be misdirected.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of uncertainty in absence and demand
on the overtime decision of firms. Starting from the basic labor demand model for workers
and hours, the models allow for short-time and potential corner solutions without overtime.
Moreover, stochastic variations in the attendance rate of its workers and in the demand for
goods are included. The paper then identifies two different mechanisms leading to an increase
in average hours per worker, inducing overtime. So to account for the observed overtime hours,
we do not necessarily need to recur to models with non-stochastic cost minimizing demand for
overtime.
Recently, Bell and Hart (2003) and Trejo (2003) also claim that the labor demand model
may not be the most accurate model to analyze overtime issues. Their focus is quite different,
however, as they do not specify the determinants of hours worked. Total remuneration and
average hours are treated as fixed job characteristics, whereas the hourly wage is used as a
compensating wage differential to accommodate changes in the underlying policy parameters,
such as overtime premium or standard hours. The issue here is whether volatility in demand
and attendance can explain the relatively high observed overtime figures.
The paper is most closely related to Ehrenberg (1970), who studied the impact of stochastic
absenteeism on the demand for hours in a cost minimizing framework. He concluded that a
stochastic employee absentee rate leads on average to a smaller amount of overtime per worker
than in the case of a certainty absentee rate. This is the opposite of the conclusion reached
here. The difference is based on two arguments. First, Ehrenberg (1970) did not prove that
on average overtime declines, but instead showed that at the average absentee rate, overtime
is smaller in the stochastic model compared to the certainty case. This remains true, and is
also shown to hold for stochastic demand. However, as hours worked are a convex function of
absenteeism, Jensen’s inequality implies that expected overtime exceeds overtime at expected
absenteeism. As a consequence, expected hours exceed the hours per worker in case of a certain
rate of absenteeism. The second argument is new. Rather paradoxically, allowing for corner
solutions, or even short-time, expected hours tend to increase even more. The reason is that at
low rates of absenteeism or low demand, workers no longer work overtime, reducing the expected
marginal cost of hours. This leads to substitution towards the intensive margin — hours worked
— at the expense of the extensive margin — the number of employees. In a profit maximizing
set-up, the lower effective premium also leads to a positive scale effect on employment, but that
does not reverse the qualitative effect on expected hours.
The impact of demand uncertainty on employment and overtime has been studied by Ash-
worth et al. (1977) and Chen and Funke (2004). Even though both papers consider a demand
constrained profit maximizing firm, their models are rather different and they reach different
conclusions. Ashworth et al. (1977), treating workers and hours as perfect substitutes, conclude
that an increase in volatility of demand might increase employment and thus reduce overtime, at
least under some circumstances. In some sense this is a similar mechanism as the one identified
1For example, in a recent survey of Dutch firms in the metal-electro industry, see De Grip et al. (2003) for a
description, only 10% of the firms indicated that they used structural overtime in 2002, whereas 90% of the firms
used overtime that year. The vast majority of firms indicated that fluctuations in demand were the main reasons
for using overtime. Replacement for absenteeism was another important reason.
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by Ehrenberg (1970) for stochastic absenteeism. Chen and Funke (2004) suggest that hours
increase and employment will fall due to increased demand volatility. Their results appear to be
driven by intertemporal considerations, where due to firing and hiring costs, firms opt to wait
in a more uncertain environment in order to reduce adjustment cost.2 My paper concentrates
on the static demand for hours, with hours and workers being imperfect substitutes. In the
cost minimization model demand is subject to random fluctuations, and the profit maximizing
model considers a price taking firm where the price is subject to random fluctuations.The same
two mechanisms as identified for stochastic absenteeism are at work for stochastic demand, but
in different proportions.
Section 1 presents the two basic models under certainty; cost minimization and profit maxi-
mization. Section 2 considers the case of stochastic absenteeism and demand, concentrating on
solutions in the overtime regime. This provides the first mechanism. Section 3 is then a brief
intermezzo, pointing at the relevance of corner solutions and short-time. Section 4 allows for
the possibility of a corner solution in the certainty case. Section 5 includes the possibility of
corner solutions and short-time in the stochastic models. This provides the second mechanism.
Moreover, the stochastic profit maximization model introduces a spike at normal hours. Section
6 concludes.
1 Overtime and certain absenteeism
1.1 Cost minimization
Consider a cost minimizing firm choosing the best combination of employees n and hours per
employee h, knowing that only a fraction a of its employees will be attending during a typical
day. Labor services ` are given by a Cobb-Douglas function
` = a1/τnhγ . 0 < τ ≤ 1, 0 < γ < 1
Underlying this expression is a labor services function where workers and hours are imperfect
substitutes: first of all, there are decreasing returns to weekly hours of work h, as γ < 1;3
secondly, teamwork effects may be present leading to increasing returns to attendance a when
τ < 1.4 Coles and Treble (1996), for example, argue that assembly line technologies also lead
to nondecreasing returns to attendance. Allen (1983) provides evidence in favor of increasing
returns to attendance.
For simplicity, ignore capital services, and let there be decreasing returns to labor services.5
Let q denote the output level, and let q = `α, with 0 < α < 1, then the production function can
we written as
q = aα/τnαhαγ . (1)
Ehrenberg (1970) used a similar Cobb-Douglas production function to obtain specific results,
but without teamwork effects (τ = 1).
Labor costs consist of various parts. First, attending employees working the normal workweek
h¯ get a hourly wage of w. Both are exogenously given for the firm. When working overtime,
2Moreover, their CES production function appears to be flawed, as even in the long-run hours per worker are
not invariant to scale.
3This condition corresponds to the second-order condition for cost minimization.
4More specifically, consider the CES labor services function `/n =

nP
i=1
1
n
hγτi
1/τ
, with 0 < τ ≤ 1. To allow
for absence we need the condition τ > 0, otherwise each individual worker would be essential in the production
process. Teamwork is important when hours worked by different workers are no perfect substitutes, that is for
τ < 1. Absent workers have hi = 0, whereas attending workers all work the same amount of hours hi = h.
5Including capital services in a simple model of hours demand does not alter the main conclusion of the paper,
see de Regt (2005a).
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that is when h > h¯, employees get an overtime premium θ > 0. Legislated overtime premiums,
if existent, are typically in the order of 25 to 50%, see Hart (2004) and OECD (1998). By now it
is well documented that firms face quasi-fixed costs beside the hourly wage costs, see e.g. Hart
(1984) or Hamermesh (1993) for overviews. These quasi-fixed costs do not vary with the length
of the workweek, but may depend on attendance a. Let v denote the fixed costs per employee,
independent of attendance. Sick pay, on the other hand, is only paid to absent workers. They
get a fraction ρ, 0 ≤ ρ < 1, of normal pay wh¯. Thus absent workers get no overtime premium,
even if overtime was scheduled. In the Netherlands, for example, firms must continue to pay
at least 70% of the normal salary of sick employees during the first year of sickness, implying
ρ = 0.7. Combining these terms, total labor costs can be written as
C =
{
v + ρ(1− a)wh¯+ aw [h¯+ (1 + θ)(h− h¯)]}n.
This corresponds to the specification used by Ehrenberg (1970). In fact this equation only holds
for h > h¯, but as in Ehrenberg this restriction will be ignored until Section 3, assuming that the
solution entails overtime. Indeed, aggregate data always report positive overtime, although this
may also be due to the fact that short-time is typically underreported, if reported at all.
Using the production function (1) to substitute out employment n, the first-order condition
for cost minimization can easily be written as
aw(1 + θ)h = γ
{
v + ρ(1− a)wh¯+ aw [−θh¯+ (1 + θ)h]} . (2)
Accordingly, optimal hours are given as
h∗ =
γ
1− γ
z − θ
1 + θ
≡ f(z, θ)h¯, (3)
where
z ≡ v + ρ(1− a)wh¯
awh¯
.
The variable z represents fixed labor costs as a fraction of normal wage costs of attending
workers. It summarizes the relative price effects at the intensive and extensive margins, except
for the impact of the overtime premium θ. An increase in z corresponds to a relative increase of
the costs at the extensive margin, and thus leads towards a substitution in the direction of more
hours worked and less employees. This may be due to an increase in non-wage costs v, higher
sick-pay ρ or higher absenteeism (1−a).6 The overtime premium θ unambiguously reduces hours
worked per employee. First, the premium increases the marginal costs of hours, this is reflected
in the denominator of f(z, θ). Moreover, a higher premium reduces the fixed cost of attending
employees by −θwh¯, as reflected in the numerator of f(z, θ). Finally, shifts in demand q do not
affect hours demand.7
Substitution of optimal hours h∗ in the production function (1) gives the optimal number of
employees ncc with a certain demand q and attendance rate a
8
ncc = q
1/αa−1/τ h¯−γf(z, θ)−γ . (4)
As in Ehrenberg (1970) an increase in absenteeism, or a decrease in attendance a, leads to
a scale effect at fixed output levels and a substitution effect through z. Both effects work in
6Yaniv (1995) extended the model to incorporate a feedback of overtime to absenteeism. Excessive overtime
increases the probability of burnout, and hence might be a cause of absenteeism. This is ignored here.
7In a model with capital services, this property vanishes in the short run, except when the substitution elasticity
between capital and labor is unity, see de Regt (2005a).
8The superscript c in ncc refers to the cost minimizing solution, the subscript c refers to the certainty case.
Lateron, the superscript p will be used for profit maximization and the subscript u for uncertainty.
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opposite direction. Whether the scale effect of lower attendance at fixed output levels dominates
the substitution effect depends on teamwork effects τ and on the relative price z. Indeed, the
elasticity of employment with respect to attendance is
∂ lnncc
∂ ln a
= −1
τ
+ γ
z + ρ
z − θ .
When z is sufficiently large, for example when absenteeism is high, an increase in the certainty
absence rate, thus a decrease in a, increases hours worked but also tends to lead to a larger
employment level through the scale effect. The scale effect increases when teamwork effects are
stronger, that is for low τ .
1.2 Profit maximization
Next consider a profit maximizing firm. Having decreasing returns employment n, I consider
a price taking firm. Let p denote the exogenous price faced by by the firm, then, using the
production function (1) and the definition of z, profits pi can be written as
pi = paα/τnαhαγ − aw [(z − θ)h¯+ (1 + θ)h]n.
Maximizing profits with respect to hours h and employment n gives the first-order conditions
0 =
∂pi
∂n
= αpaα/τnα−1hαγ − aw [(z − θ)h¯+ (1 + θ)h] (5a)
0 =
∂pi
∂h
= αγpaα/τnαhαγ−1 − aw(1 + θ)n. (5b)
Solving for hours gives the scale invariant h∗ = f(z, θ)h¯ as before, whereas the profit maximizing
employment level npc is given by
npc =
(
αγpa(α−τ)/τ
(1 + θ)wf(z, θ)1−αγ h¯1−αγ
)1/(1−α)
. (6)
The comparative statics are standard, except perhaps for two variables. Differentiating (6)
gives
∂ lnnpc
∂θ
=
α(1− γ)
(1− α)(z − θ)
(
1− αγ
α(1− γ) − f(z, θ)
)
and
∂ lnnpc
∂ ln a
=
α− τ
τ(1− α) +
1− αγ
1− α
z + ρ
z − θ >
α(1− τγ)
τ(1− α) > 0.
The impact of the overtime premium θ is ambiguous. A higher overtime premium decreases em-
ployment when optimal hours are long, that is for h∗ > 1−αγα(1−γ) h¯ > h¯, but increases employment
for lower levels of overtime. For reasonable values of the parameters, the latter case is most
likely. The impact of absenteeism on employment is unambiguous, however. Higher attendance
a increases employment, as contrary to the cost minimizing solution the ambiguous scale effect
is always dominated by the substitution effect.
2 Stochastic absenteeism and demand
In contrast to the previous section, let attendance a vary stochastically over its domain [0, 1], with
expected value E(a). Correspondingly, the relative cost z is redefined at expected attendance
E(a). Similarly, let demand q > 0 be a stochastic variable with expected value E(q) in the
4
cost minimization model, or let the price p > 0 be stochastic with expected value E(p) for the
profit maximization model. The corresponding solutions for employment in the certainty case
(4) and (6) are evaluated at these expected values. For simplicity, let absenteeism and demand
(or price) be uncorrelated.9
The timing of the firm’s decisions is that workers are to be hired before the stochastic
variables are revealed, but hours can be adjusted after the shocks have realized. Therefore,
actual hours are no longer scale independent in the short-run.
2.1 Cost minimization
To solve the stochastic cost minimizing model, invert the production function (1) to obtain
constrained hours as
hc = q1/αγa−1/τγn−1/γ . (7)
Substituting out hours from labor costs expected costs, using the definition of z, can be written
as
E(C) = (z − θ)E(a)wh¯n+ (1 + θ)wE(q1/αγa−(1−τγ)/τγ)n−(1−γ)/γ .
Minimizing this with respect to employment n gives the employment level
ncu = E
(
q1/αγ
)γ
E
(
a−(1−τγ)/τγ
)γ
E(a)−γ h¯−γf(z, θ)−γ . (8)
Comparing this expression with the solution under certainty (4) gives
ncu
ncc
= δcn ≡
(
E(q1/αγ)
E(q)1/αγ
E(a−(1−τγ)/τγ)
E(a)−(1−τγ)/τγ
)γ
.
The parameter δcn summarizes the impact of stochastic variations in demand and absenteeism on
employment. The impact of absenteeism is somewhat different, because it also directly influences
costs. The result is given as:
Proposition 1 In a cost minimizing framework with fixed premium rate θ, random absenteeism
and random demand lead to a larger pool of employees, as δcn > 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
For absenteeism, this was the effect identified by Ehrenberg (1970), see also Hart (2004). The
intuition is the following. For a given number of employees, random variations in absenteeism
lead to higher expected hours, and thus to higher expected costs, compared to the hours at
certain absenteeism and demand. The optimal response of the firm is to increase the number of
employees. As the proposition illustrates, as similar effect occurs for demand uncertainty. There
is one difference, however. The impact of demand works solely through the production function,
whereas attendance also directly affects labor costs. This explains the different structure of the
production function parameters in δcn.
As the production function is unchanged, the mirror image is that conditional hours — that
is hours given the expected value of absenteeism and demand — decline. Indeed, substituting
ncu in (7), conditional cost minimizing hours are given by
hc|q=E(q),a=E(a) = δc
−1/γ
n h
∗ < h∗.
9The empirical evidence points to a positive correlation between absenteeism and the business cycle, however,
see Audas and Goddard (2001) for a recent study.
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This led Ehrenberg (1970) to conclude that stochastic absenteeism tends to reduce hours worked.
But given the convex relation between hours worked and absenteeism or demand, expected hours
are larger than conditional hours. Using equation (7) and taking expectations gives
E(hc)
h∗
= δch ≡
E(a)E(a−1/τγ)
E(a−(1−τγ)/τγ)
, (9)
where δch summarizes the impact of stochastic variations in demand and absenteeism on hours
worked. This yields the following result.
Proposition 2 In a cost minimizing framework with fixed premium rate θ, random absenteeism
increases expected hours above the certainty level, as δch > 1. Random demand does not affect
expected hours.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Stochastic variations in demand do not affect expected hours, even though conditional hours
decline. The increase in expected hours due to the convex relation between hours worked and
demand is exactly offset by the negative effect through increased employment. This reflects
the fact that equilibrium hours h∗ are scale independent. For absenteeism, however, the addi-
tional impact on labor costs leads to an increase in expected hours. Thus Ehrenberg’s original
conclusion is reversed: random absenteeism increases average hours.
2.2 Profit maximization
In the profit maximizing model hours worked are set ex post according to the first-order condition
(5b). Solving for hours worked, this yields
hp =
(
αγpa(α−τ)/τn−(1−α)
(1 + θ)w
)1/(1−αγ)
. (10)
A higher price p increases hours worked, as it increases marginal revenue. Attendance a also
increases marginal revenue, but at the same time it increases marginal costs. Hence the impact is
ambiguous. With weak teamwork effects (τ > α) the cost effect dominates and higher attendance
reduces hours worked. But hours worked increase when teamwork effects are stronger (τ < α).
Using the envelope theorem, the expected profit maximizing employment level is set as
0 =
∂E(pi)
∂n
= E
(
αpaα/τhp
αγ
nα−1
)
− w [(z − θ)E(a)h¯+ (1 + θ)E(ahp)] .
Substituting (10) and solving, the optimal employment level under uncertainty is
npu =

αγE
(
p
1
1−αγ
)1−αγ
E
(
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
)1−αγ
(1 + θ)wE(a)1−αγf(z, θ)1−αγ h¯1−αγ

1/(1−α)
. (11)
Comparing with the solution under certainty (6) gives
npu
npc
= δpn ≡
E
(
p
1
1−αγ
)1−αγ
E(p)
E
(
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
)1−αγ
E(a)α(1−τγ)/τ

1/(1−α)
.
where the parameter δpn gives the impact of stochastic variations in demand and absenteeism on
employment. Proposition 3 summarizes.
6
Proposition 3 In a profit maximizing framework with fixed premium rate θ,
• random demand leads to a larger pool of employees,
• random absenteeism leads to
– a smaller pool of employees when teamwork effects are weak (τ > α),
– a larger pool of employees when teamwork effects are strong (τ < α).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Compared to the cost minimizing firm, see Proposition 1, there is an additional scale ef-
fect. With weak teamwork effects, absenteeism and hours are positively related, recall equation
(10). As the relation is convex in this case, stochastic absenteeism will increase hours at given
employment level, increasing production costs. As a result, the profit maximizing output and
employment levels fall. This effect dominates the positive effect on employment in the cost mini-
mizing firm. When teamwork effects are stronger, the correlation between absenteeism and hours
becomes negative, see equation (10). This reduces the negative scale effect, and employment
increases as for a cost minimizing firm.
The mirror image of the changed employment level is the change in conditional hours. Sub-
stituting employment (11) in the hours equation (10), and evaluating this at expected price and
attendance gives
hp|p=E(p),a=E(a) = δp
− 1−α1−αγ
n h
∗.
So when employment increases, due to for example random demand, conditional hours fall.
However, taking expectations of the hours equation (10), expected hours are given as
E(hp)
h∗
= δph ≡
E(a)E
(
a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)
)
E
(
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
) , (12)
where the parameter δph gives the impact of stochastic variations in demand and absenteeism on
hours worked. Proposition 4 summarizes.
Proposition 4 In a profit maximizing framework with fixed premium rate θ,
• random demand does not affect expected hours,
• random absenteeism
– increases expected hours when teamwork effects are weak (τ > α),
– reduces expected hours when teamwork effects are strong (τ < α).
Proof. See Appendix A.
As before, random demand – or price in this case – does not affect average hours. But,
whereas the cost minimizing model predicts an increase in expected hours due to random ab-
senteeism, the sign of the effect may vary according to the production technology in the profit
maximizing model. With weak teamwork effects, stochastic variations in absenteeism increase
expected hours, but with strong teamwork effects expected hours will be reduced, as predicted
by Ehrenberg (1970), but for a rather different reason.
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Table 1: Overtime and stochastic demand
σ 0.1 0.2
δch = δ
p
h 1. 1.
δcn 1.006 1.023
δpn 1.021 1.089
2.3 Numerical example
Although the sign of the impact of stochastic absenteeism and demand has been identified,
the size of the effects is not clear yet. A numerical illustration may provide some indication.
Two sets of parameters determine the size of the impact: first, parameters from the production
functions; and second, the parameters of the distribution of attendance and demand.
To start with the first, returns to employment α roughly correspond to the share of labor.
So α = 0.7 seems rather innocuous. Hart (2004) provides an overview of the estimates of the
returns to hours αγ. This parameter is not very precisely estimated, but returns to hours seem
to be somewhat smaller than returns to employment. I set γ = 0.8, somewhat lower than the 0.9
used by Chen and Funke (2004), but slightly higher than the 0.75 used by Ortega (2003). Allen
(1983) estimated increasing returns to attendance in the US, this can be used to determine the
teamwork parameter τ . Three broad alternatives will be considered: no teamwork, τ = 1, weak
teamwork τ = 0.8, and strong teamwork effects τ = 0.6. The latter two are broadly consistent
with Allen’s (1983) estimates.10
With respect to the distribution of of firm-specific demand q or price p, it is assumed that
these two variables have lognormal distributions. Their means do not affect the δ’s, nor the
expected hours worked, but only the employment level. Chen and Funke (2004) use σq = 0.12
as their baseline for the standard deviation of demand, varying from 0.08 to 0.18.11 More or less
similarly, I use two values, σ = 0.1 and σ = 0.2, for the standard deviation of both (log) demand
and (log) price. As absenteeism typically has a rather skew distribution, it is assumed that
attendance is distributed according to a Beta-distribution, as in Allen (1983). Mean attendance
E(a) is set at 0.95, implying a reasonable 5% average rate of absenteeism. Allen (1983) estimates
the variance of absenteeism – and thus of attendance – to be somewhere between 0.016 and
0.034. The higher variance implies a rather unlikely U-shaped density function, with clusters
around zero and one. So I concentrate on lower variance levels, with σ2a = 0.01 and σ
2
a = 0.015,
respectively.12
Table 1 gives the impact of demand uncertainty on the demand for hours and employment.
The impact is independent of the teamwork parameter τ , as can be seen looking at the definitions
of the δ’s. Demand uncertainty does not affect expected hours, but increases the employment
level by 0.6% to almost 9%. The impact increases with the standard deviation, as was to be
expected. Moreover, the impact is stronger in the profit maximizing model than in the cost
minimizing model, but this could just reflect the fact that the standard variation of prices is
perhaps smaller than the standard variation of output, as would be the consequence of an elastic
demand curve.
Table 2 gives the impact of stochastic absenteeism on the demand for hours and employment.
10The labor services specification used by Allen (1983) is ` = (1− a)−βanh. So the elasticity of labor services
with respect to attendance a is ∂ ln `
∂ ln a
= 1 + β a
1−a . Two estimates of β are presented: 0.019 and 0.046; where the
lower value is considered to be more reasonable. As ∂ ln `
∂ ln a
= 1
τ
in my specification, this can be used to infer the
teamwork parameter τ . With mean attendance of 0.95, the corresponding values for τ are 0.73 and 0.53.
11Using a uniform distribution, Ortega (2003) utilizes a fairly high coefficient of variation of 0.5.
12Let a ∼ B(b1, b2) denote the Beta distribution of attendance, then the parameters (b1, b2) are given by
(3.563, 0.188) for low variance and (2.058, 0.108) for the high variance case. Both sets of parameters imply a
unimodal J-shaped density function clustered near one.
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Table 2: Overtime and stochastic absenteeism
τ 1 0.8 0.6
σ2a 0.01 0.015 0.01 0.015 0.01 0.015
δch 1.027 1.077 1.039 1.158 1.070 3.167
δcn 1.002 1.004 1.006 1.013 1.018 1.045
δph 1.012 1.025 1.004 1.008 0.995 0.992
δpn 0.998 0.996 0.998 0.997 1.005 1.007
In the cost minimizing model, the effect on hours is strongly influenced by both the variance
of attendance and the teamwork parameter. Without any teamwork effects, expected hours
increase by 3% to 7%, depending on the variance of attendance. With weak teamwork effects,
expected hours increase even by 4% to 16%, and with strong teamwork effects they would increase
unrealistically by more than 300% in case of high variance. At the same time employment would
increase by almost 5% in the latter case. For weaker teamwork effects, employment is increasing
only very little.
In the profit maximizing model, the effects on expected hours are smaller. In line with
Propositions 3 and 4, hours increase and employment decreases with weak or no teamwork
effects, and vice versa for strong teamwork. The effects remain limited, however.
What explains the large differences in expected hours between the cost minimizing and profit
maximizing models? Ashworth et al. (1977) concluded that overtime is mostly a response to
too little, instead of too much, demand, as a profit maximizing firm can simply decide to supply
less than demand when demand is high. Similarly in terms of absenteeism, a profit maximizing
firm can simply decide to supply less when absenteeism is high, whereas a cost minimizing firm
should always satisfy demand and increase hours.
The international overview of Hart (2004) reveals that average overtime hours vary between
one to four hours per week. With a normal workweek of about 40 hours, this amounts to
2.5% to 10% of normal hours, as mentioned in the introduction. Table 2 seems to suggest that
fluctuations in absenteeism can only explain part of the observed overtime hours, at least in
the profit maximizing model. Rather paradoxically, the following sections will argue that the
possible occurrence of short-time may provide a further explanation for observed overtime.
3 The relevance of normal hours and short-time
Although overtime is an important phenomenon, only a (large) minority of employees does work
more than normal hours. For the US, DeLeire, Bhattacharva et al. (2002) report overtime
incidence of around 12% for all workers and 19% for production workers in manufacturing. This
is somewhat lower than earlier estimates in Trejo (1993). Friesen (2002) reports that in 1997 in
Canada only 9% of the jobs usually required overtime. According to Kalwij and Gregory (2003)
one-third of male employees in the UK work paid overtime. This is slightly higher than the 20%
in 1993 for Germany or the UK documented by Bell, Hart et al. (2000).13 Hart (2004) provides
some further evidence, including unpaid overtime.
Additionally, Ortega (2003) presents evidence of sizeable spikes at normal hours: in the US,
about one third of the employees were working exactly 40 hours in 2002; in France about 40% of
the employees were exactly working the 39 hours legal workweek in 1999; and in the unregulated
UK peaks of 10 to 20% were observed for 37 to 40 hours in 1991. Beside these spikes, Ortega’s
figures also illustrate that there are numerous workers working less than normal hours. Partly
13The evidence of the Dutch statistical bureau suggests that paid overtime incidence in the Netherlands is only
about 10%.
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this will be due to part-time work, but we can not eliminate the possibility that some of them
work short-time. Indeed, Van Audenrode (1994) has established the importance of short-time
compensation systems in Europe. Countries with generous short-time compensation programs
have larger hours responses to downward variations in the need for labor. However, it is difficult
to obtain data about short-time working.
These observations point at two weaknesses of the previous models: first, they do not allow for
corner solutions and short-time; and second, they do not distinguish between overtime incidence
and hours worked by overtime workers. In de Regt (2005b) I develop a model with overtime
incidence and hours worked by overtime workers and show that overtime hours and overtime
incidence are typically positively related. Thus focussing only on hours worked can be viewed
as reduced form analysis. Therefore, this paper just focusses on the first issue, and allows for
the possibility of no overtime. This will lead to additional effects of uncertainty.
4 A corner solution with certainty
To accommodate the possibility of corner solutions and short-time, the cost structure has to be
modified. In the previous sections, as in Ehrenberg’s original model, no distinction was made
between solutions with and without overtime. All hours command the same premium θ > 0.
However, when hours worked fall below standard hours h¯, no overtime premium is paid anymore
and the compensation schedule should not fail to incorporate this. To do so, let wo(h) denote
the remuneration of attending workers. The compensation schedule o(h) thus summarizes the
compensation of hours. The schedule with a fixed overtime premium θ used up to here was
o(h) = h¯+ θ(h− h¯) = −θh¯+ (1 + θ)h. (13)
A straightforward generalization incorporating short-time and overtime is the kinked schedule
o(h) = h¯+max
(
θs(h− h¯), θo(h− h¯)
)
. − 1 ≤ θs ≤ 0 < θo (14)
For overtime hours h > h¯ the firm pays a fixed overtime premium θ = θo, as before, but if hours
worked fall below standard hours, the firm pays an short-time premium θ = θs. This may be
due to institutional or contractual arrangements, such as short-time rules, etc. For θs = 0, the
marginal cost of an additional hour below standard hours is just the hourly wage w, as in Chen
and Funke (2004), Ortega (2003) and Trejo (2003). However, when θs = −1 as in Ahsworth et
al. (1977), institutional arrangements force the firm to pay the normal standard pay wh¯ even
when less hours are worked. Intermediate cases of generosity of short-time compensation may
be relevant, see Van Audenrode (1994).14
Solving the certainty models with the kinked compensation schedule (14) is rather straight-
forward. First, solve the model for a fixed premium rate θ, being either θo or θs. The corre-
sponding solution is h = f(z, θ)h¯, as before. As hours worked are decreasing in the premium θ,
f(z, θo) < f(z, θs). Three mutually exclusive cases can be distinguished: first, when f(z, θo) > 1,
the solution entails structural overtime; second, for f(z, θs) < 1, normal hours are too long and
there is structural short-time; the remaining intermediate case is f(z, θo) < 1 < f(z, θs), leading
to the corner solution h = h¯. What regime prevails thus depends on the fixed costs z in relation
to the overtime and short-time premiums.
Another way to characterize the solution will be useful lateron. As hours worked are decreas-
ing in the premium θ, there is a unique premium rate θ¯ leading exactly to the corner solution
14There may a be a link between the sick replacement rate ρ and the undertime premium θs. When ρ > −θs,
claiming sick-pay is more attractive than working undertime. This may lead to shirking behavior. On the other
hand, ρ < −θs may lead to presenteeism, where sick employees come to work to collect undertime payment, see
Chatterji and Tilley (2002).
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h = h¯. This virtual premium is implicitly defined by f(z, θ¯) = 1. As a consequence, θ¯ is increas-
ing in z.15 The prevailing actual premium θ can be found comparing the virtual premium θ¯(z)
with the short-time and overtime premium θs and θo. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Allowing for the possibility of short-time and corner solutions in the models
under certainty, the relevant premium θ is determined as
θ =

θs for θ¯(z) ≤ θs
θ¯(z) for θs < θ¯(z) < θo
θo for θo ≤ θ¯(z).
(15)
This allows us to identify three cases:
• Structural overtime. For high values of θ¯(z) — and thus high values of z — permanent
overtime will prevail. Intuitively, the marginal costs of the intensive margin — hours —
is relatively low compared to the marginal cost of the extensive margin — the number of
employees. This was the case considered in Section 1.
• Normal hours. For intermediate levels of θ¯(z) it is optimal to let the workweek correspond
to the standard workweek h¯.
• Structural short-time. Finally, there is even a range where structural short-time may
prevail, but in view of the available evidence, this does not seem to be the most relevant
option.16
5 Uncertainty and short-time
Incorporating the kinked compensation schedule (14) in the models with uncertainty, introduces
various regimes in the model. There is a positive probability Φs that short-time occurs and hours
fall below normal hours h¯. Moreover, in the profit maximizing model there will be a probability
Φ¯ that the corner solution at normal hours applies. The firm can influence the probabilities of
these regimes to occur. For example, reducing the employment level n, the firm reduces the
likelihood of the short-time regime, but at the cost of more overtime being worked. The firm
should balance these issues.
5.1 Cost minimization
First consider the cost minimization model. Contrary to the certainty model, there is no corner
solution. The reason is simple, ex post hours should always satisfy the constrained demand
equation (7), and with continuous distributions of attendance a and demand q, the mass of the
corner solution h = h¯ is zero. So there are just two regimes in the cost minimization model: short-
time and overtime. This makes the expected cost minimization problem analytically somewhat
complex. It is solved in Appendix B. Although no closed form solution can be given, a succinct
and useful expression for employment is
ncu = E
(
q1/αγ
)γ
E
(
a−(1−τγ)/τγ
)γ
E(a)−γ h¯−γf(z +∆c, θc)−γ , (16)
where the virtual premium θc ∈ (θs, θo) is a weighted average of the overtime and short-time
premiums θo and θs and ∆c > 0. Exact definitions of these parameters are given in Appendix
B, but both depend on employment ncu. Hence, equation (16) only provides an implicit solution
to employment.
15More specifically, the virtual premium is given as θ¯(z) = γz − (1− γ).
16For θs = 0 this can perhaps be interpreted as the part-time solution, as in Ortega (2003).
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The solution for expected hours can also be expressed in terms of these parameters, yielding
E(hc) = δchf(z +∆
c, θc)h¯. (17)
Both equations closely resemble the solution for employment (8) and expected hours (9)
found in the earlier cost minimization model with uncertainty of Section 2.1. The possible
occurrence of the short-time regime generates two important differences:
• First the use of the premium rate θc instead of either θo or θs. The reason is simple:
whereas for high absenteeism and high demand attending employees will work overtime,
they may work short-time for low absenteeism or low demand. Therefore, sometimes the
overtime premium θo prevails, but in other cases the short-time premium θs. The average
premium θc paid is thus lower than the overtime premium θo, but higher than the short-
time premium θs. Accordingly, hours are substituted for employees and expected hours
increase, but employment falls.
• The second difference is catched by the term ∆c > 0. In the compensation schedule (13) the
premium θ not only increases the marginal costs of hours, but also reduces the fixed costs
of attending employees by −θwh¯. In the stochastic case with the kinked compensation
schedule (14), the average premium is θc, but due to the kink the reduction in fixed costs
of attending employees is less than −θcwh¯. The reason is that the average premium θc also
reflects the convex relation between hours worked and absenteeism or demand, whereas
for the reduction in fixed costs of attending employees it mainly matters whether overtime
is worked or not. This difference is captured by the term ∆c > 0.17 As a consequence, the
costs of the extensive margin increase, leading to another substitution effect towards more
hours worked and less employees.
Comparing equations (17) and (9), the impact of these two substitution effects on expected
hours is given by the ratio
λch ≡
f(z +∆c, θc)
f(z, θ)
,
where the relevant premium θ of the denominator is defined by Proposition 5. For employment
the substitution effect is λcn ≡ λc
−γ
h . These λ-terms capture the impact of uncertainty through the
variation in the premium rates. Their size is ambiguous and depends on the point of departure:
with structural overtime under certainty, λch > 1, expected hours unambiguously increase and
employment decreases through this mechanism; but the opposite would hold with structural
short-time under certainty. The proposition summarizes.
Proposition 6 Allowing for the possibility of short-time in the cost minimization model under
uncertainty, leads to a substitution effect between hours and employees. The sign and size of the
effect depends on λch:
• λch > 1 in case of structural overtime under certainty and expected hours increase;
• λch R 1 in case of normal hours under certainty;
• λch < 1 in case of structural short-time under certainty and expected hours decrease.
Proof. See Appendix B.
17In Appendix B the reduction in fixed costs of attending employees is shown to be −θ˜cwhn, with θs < θ˜c <
θc < θo. The parameter ∆
c = θc − θ˜c > 0 measures the difference.
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5.2 Profit maximization: a spike at normal hours
In the profit maximizing model, optimal hours are given by equation (10). Whether overtime
or short-time prevails does depend on the price level p. Let p¯(θ) denote the price level where
actual and normal hours coincide, so
p¯(θ) =
(1 + θ)wa−(α−τ)/τ h¯1−αγn1−α
αγ
,
and p¯(θ) is increasing in the prevailing premium θ. As a consequence, p¯(θo) > p¯(θs) and actual
hours will be equal to normal hours as long as the price p is within this interval. The probability
of this state to occur is
Φ¯p = Pr[h = h¯] =
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θo)
p¯(θs)
dFp(p)dFa(a).
The profit maximizing model thus predicts a spike at normal hours, as in Ortega (2003). This is a
very attractive feature of the model, corresponding to the stylized facts of the hours distribution.
There is again no closed form solution, but using virtual overtime premiums, the solution
can be written as
npu =

αγE
(
p
1
1−αγ
)1−αγ
E
(
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
)1−αγ
(1 + θpn)wE(a)1−αγf(z +∆pn, θpn)1−αγ h¯1−αγ

1/(1−α)
, (18)
with expected hours
E(h) = δphf(z +∆
p, θp)h¯. (19)
As before, the virtual premiums θpn > θp are weighted averages of the overtime and short-
time premiums θo and θs and ∆
p
n > ∆p > 0. Exact definitions of these parameters are given
in Appendix C, but they depend on employment npu. Hence, equation (18) only provides an
implicit solution to employment. Nevertheless, these equations are rather similar to the solution
for employment (11) and expected hours (12) found in the earlier profit maximization model
with uncertainty, but without short-time or corner solutions. Again the difference is the use of
the virtual premiums, leading to a substitution effect between hours and employment, and a
scale effect for employment.
For expected hours, the size of the substitution effect is given by
λph ≡
f(z +∆p, θp)
f(z, θ)
.
For employment, there is an additional scale effect of the virtual premium rate, working in the
opposite direction of the substitution effect. The total impact is denoted λpn, which is inversely
related to λph, see Appendix C. To summarize
Proposition 7 Allowing for the possibility of short-time and corner solutions in the profit max-
imization model under uncertainty, leads to a substitution effect between hours and employment
and a scale effect for employment. The sign and size of the substitution effect depends on λph,
whereas the total effect on employment is determined by λpn.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Contrary to the cost minimization model, it is no longer possible to determine the sign of
the effects analytically. So we have to use numerical simulations.
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5.3 Numerical example
The parameters of the production function and the distributions of absenteeism and demand
are the same as used in the numerical Section 2.3, although we concentrate on the cases with
low variances of demand and absenteeism. Furthermore, we need some parameters of the cost
structure.18 In line with the results of Bell and Hart (2003), the overtime premium is set as
θo = 0.3. This is lower than the legislated 0.5 in the US, but seems fairly representative for
European countries. The short-time premium is set at θs = 0, so it is not costly for firms to
reduce hours below normal hours.
Finally, we need to determine z, the fixed labor costs as a percentage of normal wage costs.
This variable is calibrated to obtain meaningful levels of relative overtime hours in (3). Setting
f(z, θo) = 1.05, implies z = 0.641. So, quasi-fixed labor costs are non-negligible, as documented
in Hart (1984).19 To allow for the possibility of normal hours in the certainty case, equation
(15) provides a range of values for z: for z ∈ [0.25, 0, 625] the certainty model would predict a
corner solution at normal hours. The value of z = 0.45 used by Chen and Funke (2004) is used
for comparison.
Table 3 provides the results. Column (1) gives the benchmark simulations for z = 0.641,
where structural overtime hours would thus be 5% of normal hours in the certainty case. Al-
lowing for short-time in the cost minimization model, the stochastic fluctuations in demand and
attendance reduce the average premium from 0.3 to 0.26 (θc). At the same time this raises fixed
labor costs z by 1.5 percentage points (∆c). Jointly, these two effect lead to a substitution from
employment to hours: expected hours increase by almost 20% (λch), whereas employment falls
by 14% (λch). The probability that hours fall below normal hours is almost 18% (Φ
c
s).
In the profit maximization model the direction of the effects is similar, but somewhat smaller
in size. This is due to the positive scale effect on employment of the lower premium rate. The
average premium rate is now 0.275 (θp), and the fixed cost increase by 0.5 percentage points
(∆p). As a consequence, expected hours increase by almost 11% (λph) and employment falls by
about 9% (λpn). The probability of the short-time regime is very small (Φ
p
s), but 35% of the time
the corner solution with hours equal to normal hours applies (Φ¯p). So the profit maximizing
model can account for a significant spike of hours at normals hours.
The other columns of Table 3 investigate the sensitivity of the results for other parameter
values. Column (2) eliminates teamwork, whereas column (3) considers the case of strong
teamwork. No substantial differences are found. Columns (4) and (5) increase the variance of
demand or absenteeism. Especially the standard deviation of demand increases the impact on
expected hours. Column (6) considers the impact of a generous short-time payment system,
where workers would still get their normal income working short-time. To reduce the likelihood
of short-time, employment is further decreased. Hence expected hours increase much more in
the cost minimization model. As the probability of short-time was almost non-existent in the
profit maximizing model, nothing really changes there.
The two final columns consider changes in the relative fixed costs z. In both cases, the
optimal solution under certainty would be the corner solution at normal hours. The latter
value of z = 0.25, is the lowest value for which the certainty solution would correspond to the
corner solution. In both cases the premium θc is reduced (much) more, and fixed costs ∆c
increase more, than in the benchmark column (1). Nevertheless, the impact on expected hours
and employment, as measured by λch and λ
c
n, respectively, is much lower. This is due to the
18A number of parameters is only needed to determine the absolute value of employment, which will not be
reported. Their choice is innocuous. Hourly wages w are normalized to one and normal hours are set at h¯ = 40.
The expected demand E(q) and expected price E(p) are normalized to generate an employment level under
certainty of ncc = n
p
c = 100.
19However, the value of z depends strongly on the parameters γ and θo. To illustrate, z = 0.451 for γ = 0.9,
and z = 0.894 for θo = 0.5. One should thus be careful interpreting the absolute value of z. Alternatively, good
estimates of z, together with information about the overtime premium, could help to determine γ, the elasticity
of hours in the production function.
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Table 3: Uncertainty and short-time
Basic Teamwork Variance Premium Corner solution
τ = 1 τ = 0.6 σq = 0.2 σ2a = θs = −1 z = 0.45 z = 0.25
σp = 0.2 0.015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cost minimization
θc 0.260 0.262 0.256 0.250 0.258 0.239 0.172 0.056
∆c 0.015 0.014 0.018 0.034 0.017 0.031 0.028 0.021
λch 1.198 1.187 1.222 1.297 1.210 1.333 1.045 0.811
λcn 0.865 0.872 0.852 0.812 0.858 0.795 0.965 1.183
Φcs 0.176 0.167 0.198 0.272 0.186 0.068 0.502 0.857
Profit maximization
θp 0.275 0.276 0.271 0.252 0.276 0.275 0.164 0.031
∆p 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006
λph 1.109 1.113 1.113 1.243 1.109 1.109 1.005 0.875
λpn 0.914 0.911 0.913 0.816 0.914 0.914 0.972 1.100
Φps 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.067 0.001 0.000 0.073 0.649
Φ¯p 0.351 0.354 0.362 0.357 0.349 0.352 0.799 0.350
lower fixed costs z in f(z + ∆c, θc). In line with Proposition 6, expected hours increase for
intermediate values of z, column (7), but decrease for low values of z, column (8). In the latter
case the probability of the short-time regime becomes unrealistically high, even in the profit
maximization model. However, for the intermediate level of z = 0.45, the profit maximization
model mainly predicts a larger spike at normal hours. Expected hours increase, but only to a
limited amount.
To obtain the total impact of uncertainty on hours and employment, the direct impact of
convexity and concavity in expectation formation as measured by the δ’s of Tables 1 and 2
should be included. Table 4 provides the total effect and its decomposition. The table considers
the benchmark case (1), as well as the corner solution (7) of Table 3. One the one hand, the
δ-rows identify the non-linearity effects of uncertainty at fixed overtime premium rate, whereas
the λ-rows give the indirect effect of reduced average premium rates when allowing for short-
time and corner solutions. The total effect is the product of the two. One the other hand, the
columns labeled demand and absenteeism, decompose the effects of the total columns (1) or
(4) into separate effects of stochastic demand and stochastic absenteeism, respectively. Absent
interaction effects, the total column would be the product of these underlying effects.
Employment decreases in column (1), as the negative premium effects (λ) dominate the
positive non-linearity effect (δ). For expected hours both effects work in the same direction,
but the bulk of the effect occurs through the premium effect. These observations hold for both
the cost minimization model and the profit maximizing model, but the effects are smaller in the
latter case. Looking at columns (2) and (3), the bulk of the total and premium effects comes from
demand uncertainty. This is not true for the non-linearity effects, however. For employment this
effect is similar for stochastic demand and stochastic absenteeism, but for expected hours the
non-linearity effect is solely due to stochastic absenteeism. So as is most clear from the profit
maximizing model, the impact of stochastic demand and stochastic absenteeism on expected
hours mainly operates through different channels: demand uncertainty operates through the
premium effect, whereas stochastic absenteeism operates through the non-linearity effect.
Looking at column (4) – with a corner solution under certainty – the premium effects (λ) are
much smaller than in column (1). The effects of non-linearity (δ) are exactly similar to column
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Table 4: Decomposition stochastic effects
z = 0.641 z = 0.45
Total Demand Absenteeism Total Demand Absenteeism
(1) (2)a (3)b (4) (5)a (6)b
Cost minimization
Employment ncu/n
c
c 0.875 0.891 0.974 0.976 0.991 0.945
δcn 1.012 1.006 1.006 1.012 1.006 1.006
λcn 0.865 0.886 0.968 0.965 0.986 0.939
Hours E(hc)/h∗ 1.245 1.164 1.083 1.086 1.019 1.124
δch 1.039 1.000 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.039
λch 1.198 1.164 1.042 1.045 1.018 1.082
Profit maximization
Employment npu/n
p
c 0.932 0.934 0.998 0.990 0.993 0.998
δpn 1.019 1.021 0.998 1.019 1.021 0.998
λpn 0.914 0.915 1.000 0.972 0.972 1.000
Hours E(hp)/h∗ 1.114 1.109 1.004 1.010 1.008 1.000
δph 1.004 1.000 1.004 1.004 1.000 1.004
λph 1.109 1.109 1.000 1.005 1.008 0.996
a Simulated with σ2a = 0.0001.
b Simulated with σq = σp = 0.001.
(1), as this effect is independent of the original situation. Roughly speaking, the premium and
non-linearity effects of column (4) contribute in the same amount to the total effect on expected
hours, but the premium effects still dominate for employment. For the profit maximization
model, the decomposition into the sources of uncertainty in columns (5) and (6) confirms the
findings of the model with higher fixed costs: the total effect is roughly speaking the product of
the separate effects; and demand dominates for employment.
In the cost minimization model the impact of only stochastic absenteeism is much larger
than the combined effect of stochastic demand and absenteeism, however. This is due to the
right-skewness of the attendance distribution. Without any uncertainty, hours worked would
be equal to normal hours. Given the weak teamwork effect (τ > α), see Proposition 3, the
non-linearity effect (δ) slightly decreases employment with stochastic attendance. This suggests
that overtime becomes relevant. But with a median of 0.995 and a mean of 0.95, the density of
attendance is right-skewed. So most of the time high attendance will reduce hours into the short-
time regime to satisfy the demand constraint (7). As a consequence, the effective premium rate
falls, which in turn induces substitution towards longer hours and less employment. Although
this somewhat further reduces the likelihood of short-time, expected hours strongly increase.
This effect is much less pronounced in the profit maximization model of column (6), as the firm
has a range of attendance rates for which it will remain producing at the corner solution. In
column (3) the effect is not so strong because overtime is worked in the certainty case. Hence
short-time is less likely to occur, reducing the large premium effects of column (6). As demand is
symmetrically distributed around its mean, the premium effects in column (5) are weaker than
in column (6). The symmetric distribution of demand also reduces the impact of absenteeism
in the joint column (4).
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6 Conclusion
Volatility in demand and attendance tend to increase average hours per worker. More specifically,
stochastic absenteeism and stochastic demand affect expected hours demand in basically two
different ways:
• At a fixed overtime premium rate, random fluctuations in absence tends to increase average
hours above the certainty hours level, whereas random fluctuations in demand do not
change expected hours. Moreover, the random variations in demand increase employment
above the certainty level, whereas random variations in absence have an ambiguous impact
on employment.
• Moreover, the random fluctuations in absenteeism and demand change the effective pre-
mium rate, as low absenteeism or low demand may force employees to work normal time
or short-time. Compared to the certainty case with structural overtime, expected hours
will unambiguously increase and the number of employees will decrease.
The relative size of these effects depends on the type of uncertainty. Moreover, they occur both
in cost minimizing and profit maximizing models. In the latter model the reduction in effective
premium rates is lower, due to the added scale effect of the lower costs. Still, the reduction in
effective premium rates appears to dominate the employment effects. The main advantage of
the profit maximizing model is that it unambiguously allows for the widely observed spike at
normal hours.
In any case, the results indicate that observed overtime may well result from the random
nature of absenteeism and demand, instead of structural cost minimizing factors. Therefore,
one should be very careful with inference based on models with structural overtime. The corner
solution at normal hours may have more relevance than the observed average overtime hours
seems to suggest.
The main empirical hypothesis implied by the paper is that the volatility of absenteeism and
demand will increase overtime hours. It will not be easy to test, however, as information about
volatility of absenteeism or demand is much harder to get than information about their levels.
Besides empirical testing, future research should also extend the theoretical analysis. An
important distinction is the choice between overtime incidence and overtime hours. Moreover,
absenteeism should be endogenized. Both aspects underline the importance of labor supply
factors, and stress the need for analyzing the link between overtime and absenteeism in a partial
equilibrium framework.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Consider δ˜cn ≡ δc1/γn = E(q
1/αγ)
E(q)1/αγ
E(a−(1−τγ)/τγ)
E(a)−(1−τγ)/τγ . Both q
1/αγ and a−(1−τγ)/τγ are convex functions,
therefore applying twice Jensen’s inequality implies δ˜cn > 1. Hence δ
c
n = δ˜
cγ
n > 1. ¤
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Consider δch ≡ E(a)E(a
−1/τγ)
E(a−(1−τγ)/τγ) . First, notice that x
1−τγ is a concave function. Therefore, using
Jensen’s inequality, E(a−(1−τγ)/τγ) < E(a−1/τγ)1−τγ and δch > E(a)E(a
−1/τγ)τγ . Moreover,
a−1/τγ is a convex function and Jensen’s inequality implies E(a−1/τγ)τγ > E(a)−1. Hence,
δch > 1.
Independence of expected hours of demand uncertainty follows as δch has no terms involving
the quantity q. ¤
A.3 Proof of proposition 3
Define δ˜pn ≡ δp
1−α
n =
E

p
1
1−αγ
1−αγ
E(p)
E
 
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
!1−αγ
E(a)α(1−τγ)/τ . Consider first the impact of the price p on
δ˜pn. As p1/(1−αγ) is a convex function, Jensen’s inequality implies E
(
p1/(1−αγ)
)
> E(p)1/(1−αγ).
This works in the direction of δ˜pn > 1 and thus δ
p
n > 1.
For attendance a, first notice that α(1−τγ)τ(1−αγ) R 1 for α R τ . So for α > τ the function a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ) is
convex and Jensen’s inequality works in the direction of δ˜pn > 1. However, for α < τ the function
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ) is concave and Jensen’s inequality works in the opposite direction of δ˜pn < 1. ¤
A.4 Proof of proposition 4
Consider δph ≡
E(a)E

a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)

E
 
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
! . For α = τ , the expression implies δph = 1. For α 6= τ , define
µ ≡ α−ττ(1−αγ) , so δph = E(a)E(a
µ)
E(a1+µ)
. Let α < τ , then µ ∈ (−1, 0). The function aµ is convex, whereas
a1+µ is concave. Applying Jensen’s inequalities twice implies δph > 1.
Second, let α > τ , implying µ > 0. Notice that δph can be written as δ
p
h =
E

a
1+µ
1+µ

E

a
(1+µ)
µ
1+µ

E(a1+µ)
.
As x1/(1+µ) and xµ/(1+µ) in the numerator are both concave functions, Jensen’s inequality implies
δph <
E(a1+µ)1/(1+µ)E(a(1+µ))µ/(1+µ)
E(a1+µ)
= 1.
Independence of expected hours of demand or price shocks follows as δph has no terms involv-
ing the price p. ¤
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Appendix B Expected cost minimization
B.1 Expected cost minimization
Using the compensation schedule o(h), expected costs are given by
E(C) = w
[
zE(a)h¯+E(ao(h))
]
n.
Although o(h) is non-differentiable at h = h¯, this problem is solved using the expectations
operator, as the corner solution has mass zero in the cost minimizing model. Using (7), we have
∂h
∂n = − 1γ hn . So the first-order condition for cost minimization is
0 =
dE(C)
dn
= w
[
zE(a)h¯+ E(ao(h))
]− 1
γ
wE(ao′(h)h). (B.1)
Let Fa(a) and Fq(q) denote the cumulative distribution functions of attendance a and demand
q, respectively. Moreover, let q¯ ≡ aα/τnαh¯αγ be the demand level where exactly normal hours
are worked. Then the expected value in the last term can be rewritten as
E
(
ao′(h)h
)
= (1 + θo)E (ah)− (θo − θs)
∫ 1
0
∫ q¯
0
ahdFq(q)dFa(a)
= (1 + θc)E (ah) ,
with
θc ≡ (1− ωc(n)) θo + ωc(n)θs
and
ωc(n) ≡
∫ 1
0
∫ q¯
0
ah
E (ah)
dFq(q)dFa(a).
As q¯ is increasing in n, the weight ωc(n) is increasing in n, with ωc(0) = 0 and lim
n→∞ω
c(n) = 1.
So θc ∈ (θs, θo) .
The term in the right-hand side of equation (B.1) involving the compensation schedule o(h)
can be expressed as
E (ao(h)) = (1 + θo)E (ah)− θoE(a)h¯+ (θo − θs)
∫ 1
0
∫ q¯
0
a
(
h¯− h) dFq(q)dFa(a)
= (1 + θc)E (ah)− θ˜cE(a)h¯,
with
θ˜c ≡ (1− ω˜c(n)) θo + ω˜c(n)θs
and
ω˜c(n) ≡
∫ 1
0
∫ q¯
0
a
E (a)
dFq(q)dFa(a).
The weight ω˜c(n) is increasing in n, with ω˜c(0) = 0 and lim
n→∞ω˜
c(n) = 1. So θ˜c ∈ (θs, θo) .
To compare both premium rates, define
∆c ≡ θc − θ˜c = (θo − θs) d(n),
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with
d(n) ≡ ω˜c(n)− ωc(n) =
∫ 1
0
∫ q¯
0
(
a
E(a)
− ah
E (ah)
)
dFq(q)dFa(a).
Using equation (7), notice that ahE(ah) =
q1/αγa−(1−τγ)/τγ
E(q1/αγa−(1−τγ)/τγ) . Using the definition of q¯, differenti-
ating d(n) yields
d′(n) = αnα−1h¯αγ
∫ 1
0
(
a(α+τ)/τ
E(a)
− an
1/γ h¯
E(q1/αγa−(1−τγ)/τγ)
)
fq(q¯)dFa(a).
where fq(q) is the density function of demand q. It can be checked that d′(n) is positive for
small n and negative for large n. As d(0) = lim
n→∞d(n) = 0, this implies d(n) > 0 for n > 0.
Hence ∆c > 0, or θc > θ˜c, for θo > θs.
Using the premia θc and θ˜c, the first-order condition (B.1) can be rearranged as
γ[(z − θ˜c)E(a)h¯+ (1 + θc)E (ah) = (1 + θc)E (ah) ,
or
E(ah) =
γ
1− γ
z − θ˜c
1 + θc
E(a)h¯ = f(z + θc − θ˜c, θc)E(a)h¯.
Hence
E(ah) = f(z +∆c, θc)E(a)h¯. (B.2)
Again using (7), notice that E(ah) = E(q1/αγa−(1−τγ)/τγn−1/γ). Hence, as q and a indepen-
dently distributed, the solution for employment is
ncu = E
(
q1/αγ
)γ
E
(
a−(1−τγ)/τγ
)γ
E(a)−γ h¯−γf(z +∆c, θc)−γ . (B.3)
For expected hours, notice that
E(a)E(h)
E(ah)
=
E(a)E(q1/αγa−1/τγn−1/γ)
E(q1/αγa−(1−τγ)/τγn−1/γ)
=
E(a)E(a−1/τγ)
E(a−(1−τγ)/τγ)
= δch.
So (B.2) implies
E(h) = δchf(z +∆
c, θc)h¯. (B.4)
B.2 Proof of proposition 6.
For structural overtime, θ = θo and λc =
f(z+∆c,θc)u
f(z,θo)
. As ∂f/∂z > 0 and ∂f/∂θ < 0, and
because ∆c > 0 and θc < θo, we have f(z, θo) < f(z +∆c, θc). Hence λc > 1.
For structural short-time, θ = θs and λc =
f(z+∆c,θc)
f(z,θs)
. Consider the difference
∆ = f(z, θs)− f(z +∆c, θc) = γ1− γ
(
z − θs
1 + θs
− z − θ˜
c
1 + θc
)
=
γ
1− γ
(z − θs)(θc − θs) + (θ˜c − θs)(1 + θs)
(1 + θs)(1 + θc)
> 0,
as θs < θ˜c < θc and θs ∈ [−1, 0). Hence λc < 1.
For normal hours under certainty, θ = θ¯(z) and f(z, θ¯(z)) = 1. Hence λc = f(z + ∆c, θc).
Accordingly, the size thus depends on z, as λc ≷ 1⇐⇒ θc ≶ θ¯(z +∆c). ¤
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Appendix C Expected profit maximization
C.1 Expected profit maximization
Expected profits are given by
E(pi) = E(paα/τnαhαγ)− w [zE(a)h¯+ E(ao(h))]n.
Hours are set ex post to maximize profits, yielding (10) at interior solutions, or normal hours
h¯ for intermediate prices. As ∂E(pi)∂h = 0 at interior solutions and
∂h
∂n = 0 at normal hours, the
first-order condition for employment can be written as
0 =
∂E(pi)
∂n
= E
(
αpaα/τnα−1hαγ
)
− wzE (a)h¯− wE(ao(h)h) . (C.1)
Distinguishing between the tree possible regimes – short-time, normal hours and overtime – and
substituting the corresponding demand for hours (10), this condition can be written as
0 =
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θs)
0
{
(1− γ)α 11−αγ
(
γ
(1 + θs)w
) αγ
1−αγ
p
1
1−αγ a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)n
− 1−α
1−αγ + θsawh¯
}
dFp(p)dFa(a)
(C.2)
+
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θo)
p¯(θs)
{
αpaα/τnα−1h¯αγ − awh¯
}
dFp(p)dFa(a)
+
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
p¯(θo)
{
(1− γ)α 11−αγ
(
γ
(1 + θo)w
) αγ
1−αγ
p
1
1−αγ a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)n
− 1−α
1−αγ + θoawh¯
}
dFp(p)dFa(a)
− wzE(a)h¯
To simplify, first define the virtual premium rate θ¯ that equates hours demand in (10) with
standard hours, so
1 + θ¯ ≡ αγpa
(α−τ)/τ h¯−(1−αγ)n−(1−α)
w
.
This premium is increasing in the price p, with θ¯ = θs for p = p¯(θs) and θ¯ = θo for p = p¯(θo).
Moreover, ∂θ¯∂n < 0. Using θ¯, the middle part of (C.2) can be written as
αpaα/τnα−1h¯αγ − awh¯ = (1− γ)α 11−αγ
(
γ
(1 + θ¯)w
) αγ
1−αγ
p
1
1−αγ a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)n
− 1−α
1−αγ + θ¯awh¯
and thus has the same structure as the expressions in the overtime or short-time regimes.
Next, define the virtual premium θpn as a kind of weighted harmonic mean of θo, θs and θ¯
(1 + θpn)
− αγ
1−αγ ≡ (1 + θs)−
αγ
1−αγ
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θs)
0
p
1
1−αγ a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
E
(
p
1
1−αγ
)
E
(
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
)dFp(p)dFa(a)
+
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θo)
p¯(θs)
(1 + θ¯)−
αγ
1−αγ p
1
1−αγ a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
E
(
p
1
1−αγ
)
E
(
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
)dFp(p)dFa(a)
+ (1 + θo)
− αγ
1−αγ
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
p¯(θo)
p
1
1−αγ a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
E
(
p
1
1−αγ
)
E
(
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
)dFp(p)dFa(a).
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As ∂θ
p
n
∂n < 0, θ
p
n|n=0 = θo and limn→∞θ
p
n = θs, this premium satisfies θ
p
n ∈ (θs, θo). Moreover, it is
increasing in the undelying premia, ∂θ
p
n
∂θs
> 0 and∂θ
p
n
∂θo
> 0.
Third, define another virtual premium θ˜p as a weighted arithmetic mean of θo, θs and θ¯n
θ˜p ≡ θs
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θs)
0
a
E(a)
dFp(p)dFa(a) +
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θo)
p¯(θs)
θ¯
a
E(a)
dFp(p)dFa(a)
+ θo
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
p¯(θo)
a
E(a)
dFp(p)dFa(a).
Again, it is easily established that θ˜p ∈ (θs, θo) and that θ˜p is increasing in θo and θs. Let
∆pn ≡ θpn − θ˜p denote the difference between both premia. The numerical simulations suggest
that ∆pn > 0.
Using these virtual premia, equation (C.2) can be written as
(1− γ)α 11−αγ
(
γ
(1 + θpn)w
) αγ
1−αγ
E
(
p
1
1−αγ a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
)
n
− 1−α
1−αγ = w(z − θ˜p)E(a)h¯.
So the (implicit) solution for employment can we written as
np
1−α
u =
αγE
(
p
1
1−αγ
)1−αγ
E
(
a
α(1−τγ)
τ(1−αγ)
)1−αγ
(1 + θpn)wE(a)1−αγ h¯1−αγf(z +∆pn, θpn)1−αγ
. (C.3)
For expected hours, substitute (C.3) in (10) and take expectations to get
E(h) = δphf(z +∆
p
n, θ
p
n)h¯
(1 + θpn)1/(1−αγ)
E
(
p1/(1−αγ)
)
E
(
a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)
)E
(pa(α−τ)/τ
1 + θ
)1/(1−αγ)
For the last part of this expression, define the virtual premium θph as another weighted harmonic
mean of θo, θs and θ¯n
(1 + θph)
− 1
1−αγ ≡ (1 + θs)−
1
1−αγ
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θs)
0
p
1
1−αγ a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)
E
(
p
1
1−αγ
)
E
(
a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)
)dFp(p)dFa(a)
+
∫ 1
0
∫ p¯(θo)
p¯(θs)
(1 + θ¯)−
1
1−αγ p
1
1−αγ a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)
E
(
p
1
1−αγ
)
E
(
a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)
)dFp(p)dFa(a)
+ (1 + θo)
− 1
1−αγ
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
p¯(θo)
p
1
1−αγ a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)
E
(
p
1
1−αγ
)
E
(
a
α−τ
τ(1−αγ)
)dFp(p)dFa(a).
As ∂θ
p
h
∂n < 0, θ
p
h
∣∣
n=0
= θo and lim
n→∞θ
p
h = θs, the premium satisfies θ
p
h ∈ (θs, θo). Using θph, expected
hours can be written as
E(h) = δphf(z +∆
p
n, θ
p
n)h¯
(
1 + θpn
1 + θph
)1/(1−αγ)
Furthermore, defining
1 + θp ≡ (1 + θph)1/(1−αγ) (1 + θpn)−αγ/(1−αγ)
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and
∆p ≡ θp − θ˜p
expected hours can finally be written as
E(h) = δphf(z +∆
p, θp)h¯. (C.4)
Again, θp|n=0 = θo and limn→∞θ
p = θs. However, I have not been able to prove that θp is
monotonously decreasing in n. Numerical simulations suggests this to be the case. Moreover,
specifically, the numerical simulations suggest that θpn > θ
p
h > θ
p > θ˜p. As a result, ∆pn >
∆p > 0.
Finally, to measure the premium effects on employment, compare equation (C.3) with (11)
to define
λpn ≡
[
1 + θ
1 + θpn
(
f(z, θ)
f(z +∆pn, θ
p
n)
)1−αγ]1/(1−α)
.
Using the functional form of f(z, θ) and the definition of θp and ∆p this can be rewritten as
λpn ≡
[
1 + θ
1 + θph
λp
−(1−αγ)
h
]1/(1−α)
.
24
